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ABSTRACT 
The relationship between annual growth in the catches of fishing nations and the quality of 
the  institutions  of  those  nations  is  analyzed.    Catch  volumes  are  used  as  a  proxy  for 
development, since economic performance indicators based on a common set of definitions 
do  not  exist.  49  major  fishing  nations  were  selected  for  this  study,  including  22  OECD 
countries  and  several  developing  countries.  Three  general  good  governance  indices,  for 
government-efficiency  (World  Bank),  corruption  (Transparency  International)  and 
competitiveness (World Economic Forum) and one fishery specific FAO Code of Conduct 
compliance index were used. The correlation between fisheries’ performance and the indices 
proved  to  be  spurious,  but  OECD  members  achieved  a  statistically  significant  negative 
growth  in  catches  between  1987  and  2007.  The  countries  are  divided  into  five  groups, 
including ‘Winners’ and ‘Losers’, with reference to catch growth rates over two decades. 
Most of the OECD countries fell into the category ‘Losers’, whereas “Winners” includes 
many developing countries with lower quality institutions. Some countries had experienced 
an amazing growth in catches, while others had experienced a decline. The future prospects 
for both categories are discussed.    
 
Keywords: Fisheries’ performance; Resource curse; Developing countries; OECD countries; 
Sustainable development; Genuine saving. 
 
Highlights:  
-  Annual growth in catches of fishing nations is compared with institutional quality 
-  Positive effects of good institutions known from the resource curse literature are not 
found 
-  OECD fishing countries have statistically significant negative growth in catches 1987-
2007 
-  Several developing countries with low institutional quality are ‘Winners’ in growth in 
catches 
 
 
The complete paper is published in Marine Policy: 
Flaaten O. Institutional quality and catch performance of fishing nations. Mar. Policy (2012), 
http://dx.doi.or  g/10.1016/j.marpol.2012.06.002.  A  prepublication  version  of  the  paper  is 
available  at  http://munin.uit.no/handle/10037/4597  and  copies  may  be  requested  from  the 
author at ola.flaaten@uit.no. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Is richness in natural resources good for economic growth of a country? This question has 
been raised and discussed theoretically and empirically in several papers, and the sad answer 
has often been no. On the contrary, richness in natural resources often tends to be a ‘curse’ on 
economic growth, and not a ‘blessing’ as might have been be expected.  
In this presentation I will discuss some related problems for a major renewable resource, fish 
from the ocean. In the existing literature on this topic, emphasis has been placed largely on 
valuable  mineral  resources,  such  as  oil  and  gas,  since  their  share  of  export  earnings  in 
international trade is much higher. More recent developments in the resource curse literature 
have demonstrated that countries with effective institutions perform better than the average in 
their management of natural resources, to the benefit of economic growth and social welfare.  
My  presentation  will  show  you  that  this,  until  now,  is  not  the  case  for  fisheries.  The 
developed OECD countries are performing worse than other countries. 
 
The global catch has increased immensely over the last century, in fact by a multiple of 35. 
The total world catch reached about 20 million tons in 1950 and continued to increase for 
some decades, but seemed to have peaked and levelled out in the 1980s and 1990s. This 
figure came to more than 90 million tons, including China, at the second half of the 1990s, 
when  the  absolute  peak  came.  Behind  these  figures,  huge  hidden  differences  between 
countries have emerged over the years. In the resource curse literature, the main emphasis has 
been on how resource richness has affected economic growth. Since fish is a small natural 
resource for most countries, compared to larger and more valuable mineral resources, the 
approach in this presentation is different from that of most of the resource curse literature. I 
investigate whether the performance of fisheries, as measured by the annual catch in each 
country, is affected by the quality of nation-wide institutions or fisheries institutions. I would 
have preferred to have economic figures for the fishing nations, but unfortunately such data is 
not collected by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) or any 
other global international governmental institution in a comparable format. Instead this paper 
relies on quantitative catch data from the FAO database. 
 
1.  Methods and data 
 
The research questions and claims to be discussed are: 
1.  are  fisheries  special,  compared  to  other  resource  based  industries,  and  does  this 
industry need specialised institutions to perform well?  
2.  is  the  performance  of  fisheries  at  its  best  in  nations  with  generally  effective 
institutions and little corruption?  
3.  is the performance of fisheries likely to be at its best in nations which have adopted 
and comply with the UN-FAO Code of Conduct (CC) for Responsible Fisheries?  
4.  is it true that the Code of Conduct Compliance (CCC) can be correlated with the good 
general  governance indicators  and that this  in  itself does  not  do much to  explain 
fisheries compliance?  
5.  is the performance of fisheries at its best in the developed nations, such as those in the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which have the 
economic means and knowledge needed for good governance?  
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Governmental  management  and  industry  governance  which  is  designed  to  reach  policy 
objectives  require the use of effective policy instruments.  Governmental  interference and 
industry compliance with rules and regulations should be based on  
1.  The existence of well-functioning governmental institutions,  
2.  A business friendly environment, and  
3.  The absence of corruption that could jeopardize the functioning of the government – 
business relationship.  
 
An important question is whether fisheries can be considered special and so require special 
fisheries  management  institutions  to  perform  well  or  if  it  is  sufficient  to  have  effective 
institutions in general in a country. A Nature article reports on a comprehensive study of 
compliance with the FAO Code of Conduct for responsible fisheries (CCC) in major fishing 
nations. This is a survey of expert opinion and knowledge and does not comprise the actual 
performances of countries with respect to harvest quantity or value. The top six countries 
were, in declining order: Norway, USA, Canada, Australia, Iceland and Namibia. The six at 
the bottom were Egypt, Yemen, Nigeria, Angola, Myanmar, and at the very bottom North 
Korea.  The  Asian  countries  Indonesia,  Thailand,  Sri  Lanka,  Vietnam  and  Bangladesh 
belonged to the bottom fifteen of the 53 CCC-study countries. Thus, the majority of those at 
the top of the list are industrialised and OECD member countries while most of those at the 
bottom are developing countries. 
 
2.1 Fishing nation data 
 
What constitutes a fishing nation? Several definitions of a fishing nation are used in the 
literature  -  included  those  with  the  largest  landings.  FAO  often  uses  the  top  30  when 
displaying  the  big  fishing  nations.  In  leaning  to  the  FAO  approach,  this  study  initially 
selected 53 countries in the following way - a country should belong to at least one of the 
following 15 categories:  
 
30 largest capture production countries (in tons) for: 1986-87, 1996-97 or 2006-2007  
30 largest aquaculture countries (in tons)  
30 largest aquaculture countries (in value)  
30 largest capture + aquaculture production countries (in tons)  
30 largest export countries in value. 
 
Thus, the 53 countries chosen are not just those with the largest fish landings recently, but 
also  some  with  large  landings  in  the  past,  others  which  have  a  considerable  aquaculture 
industry or are big in fish export value. Note that data for aquaculture value are available at 
the FAO, but data for capture fishing value is not. Data for 2007 was the most recently 
available from the FAO data base at the commencement of this project. To even out a little, 
the averages of two years have been used instead of data for single years. The national EEZs 
based on the Law of the Sea were established mainly in the second part of the 1970s and this 
created a change in fishing rights and power in favour of coastal states (for example Norway 
and Indonesia), at the expense of distant-water nations (including Japan and Russia). For this 
reason data from before 1986-87 has not been included.  
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For different reasons some of the 53 countries originally selected had to be omitted in the 
comparative  studies.  49  remain  for  the  ranking  of  countries  and  46  for  the  econometric 
analyses.   
 
2.2 Fisheries development and good governance indicators 
 
For each of the two decades 1987-97 and 1997-2007 and for the whole period of 20 years the 
following  indices  (compounded  annual  percentage  changes)  were  calculated  (again,  the 
terminal years of each period comprise an average of two years):  
 
i97 = annual change 1987 to 1997  
i07 = annual change 1997 to 2007 
i = annual change 1987 to 2007 
 
The data set and the calculated compounded annual changes are given in the Annex A data 
file. 
 
It is expected that modern fisheries management depends on good governance, both in the 
public and the private sector.  As regards public institutions they are necessary to avoid the 
tragedy  of  biological  and  economic  overfishing,  as  well  as  promoting  resource  rent  and 
wealth creation (see index WGI below). For the private sector it is important to have a good 
business  environment,  promoting  investment  and  fishing  possibilities  for  fishermen  and 
private  firms  (see  index  GCI  below).  In  addition,  in  industries  prone  to  continuous 
interactions between the public and the private sectors, minimal corruption with transparent 
and  legally  correct  behaviour  of  all  parties  contributes  to  efficient  use  of  resources  and 
sustainable development (see index CPI below). Based on these arguments, the following 
three indicators were chosen to represent the institutions of good governance. 
 
WGI - The Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank. 
This index reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for 213 economies over 
the period 1996–2009, using six dimensions of governance, including the two used in this 
study: government effectiveness and regulatory quality for 2007 [15] . 
Governance consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised.  This  includes  the  process  by  which  governments  are  selected,  monitored  and 
replaced;  the  capacity  of  the  government  to  effectively  formulate  and  implement  sound 
policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic 
and social interactions among them [15].  
 
CPI – The Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International. 
This paper uses the average CPI score of the 2006 and 2007 indices [16]. The goal of the CPI 
is to provide data on the perceptions of corruption within countries. The CPI is a composite 
index, based on surveys of business people and assessments by local analysts. In each country 
it consists of sources that are considered credible, even though diverse sampling frames and 
somewhat  different  methodologies  are  used.  These  perceptions  should  enhance  the 
understanding of real levels of corruption within specific countries. Overall, 14 sources are 
included  in  the  CPI  2007  index  which  originate  from  12  independent  institutions.  The 
common definition of corruption includes the misuse of public power for private benefit, for 
example the bribing of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement and embezzlement   
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of public funds. Each of the country sources also assesses the extent of corruption among 
public officials and politicians in their country [16].  
 
GCI - The Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum (WEF). 
This paper uses the index in the Global Competitiveness Report 2006-2007 [17], to match the 
latest catch data available. For WEF the most important objective is to help policy makers 
and  business  leaders  understand  the  key  factors  determining  economic  growth.  By 
comparison of countries  this helps  explain why some countries  are more successful  than 
others  in  raising the incomes  and opportunities of their populations.  A key basis for the 
annual GCI reports is a worldwide executive opinion survey undertaken by a global network 
of more than 150 (as of 2012) partner institutions. 
 
In  addition  to  the  general  good  governance  indices  WBI,  CPI  and  GCI  ,  the  following 
specific fisheries index is used: 
 
CCC - FAO (UN) Code of Conduct Compliance Index for Responsible Fisheries.  
This index, developed by and reported in [11]
1, is based on a thorough investigation of how 
some (53) major fishing countries have complied with the Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries (CC). The CC was developed in 1995 by the Food and Agriculture Organis ation of 
the United Nations (FAO) and is a detailed consensus voluntary international instrument for 
the scientific and sustainable utilisation of fisheries resources. The CCC index is based on 44 
questions to experts on fisheries management in their count ries, and includes issues of 
management targets, compliance with the CC, precaution, effectiveness, by -catch, discard, 
habitat impacts and IUU fishing, as well as the ability to maintain small -scale fisheries and 
coastal communities.  
 
OECD dummy – The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.  
The member countries of this international governmental organisation are among the richest 
and most developed in the world. OECD functions as a think tank within many fields of 
economics and governance, including fisheries [18]. Its fisheries committee (COFI) has about 
25  active  member  countries  and  all  reports  produced  within  this  field  of  expertise  are 
approved by consensus by COFI. During the years, including the two decades investigated in 
this paper, OECD has produced several reports guiding its member countries on fisheries 
governance issues, including fleet and catch management, trade and illegal, unreported and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing. OECD countries have the knowledge and means to manage their 
natural resources well. But have they succeeded with this for the fisheries? How are these 
countries performing compared to the non-OECD countries? To investigate such issues a 
dummy  variable  is  included  in  the  econometric  analysis  to  distinguish  between  OECD 
member and non-member countries.  
 
2.3 Regressions  
 
The fishing industry is a small part of the economy in most countries, which makes the 
approach in this paper different from the resource curse literature which mainly uses GDP  
                                                 
1 Also see http://www2.fisheries.com/archive/publications/reports/report14_2.php and 
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v457/n7230/full/457658a.html 
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growth as the independent variable. In fact, in the resource curse literature fisheries and some 
other globally small resource industries are not included in the analysis emanating from the 
World Bank [5]. For catch performance, the possible correlations between annual average 
changes in the catches and the good governance indicators will be investigated.  
 
Thus the task is to regress the dependent variable i on the four independent variables WGI, 
CPI, GCI and CCC, as well as the dummy variable OECD. Ideally it would have been better 
to use a time series data set since the indicators may vary across time. However, such a 
complete  data  set  for  the  four  good  governance  indicators  is  not  available,  therefore  the 
indices for the last one or two years of the investigated period are used. 
 
(1)                                                
 
The regression based on (1) has been carried out for the data set ‘Capture production (Tons)’ 
in the Annex A table.  
 
2.  Results 
 
Descriptive statistics for the variables are shown in Annex B, Table B.1, based on data for 49 
countries and entities. The average annual percentage change in the harvest of 1987-2007 for 
the 46 countries used in the regression is slightly negative
2. This average is different from the 
average change in the total catch since it is not weighted with the size of the catches of 
specific countries.  
 
3.1 Regression results 
 
The main regression results for the standardized coefficients are shown in equation (2) (t-
values in parenthesis), and more details are found in Table1.  
 
(2)    0.440(0.055)+0.061(0.122)WGI+0.095(0.179)CPI+0.010(0.024)GCI+0.011(0.035)CCC-0.477(-1.996)OECD 
 
The signs of the coefficients of the general good governance indicators WGI, CPI and GCI, 
as  well  as  for  the  specific  fisheries  indicator  CCC,  are  all  positive,  but  far  from  being 
statistically significant (the t values are given in parenthesis of equation (1)). For OECD the 
coefficient  is  negative  and  almost  significant  at  5%  level.  There  is  a  rather  strong 
multicollinearity  between  the  four  good  governance  indicators,  with  correlation  values 
between 0.806 and 0.935, and the adjusted R-square is close to zero (Annex B Table B2). 
Further,  Table  1  reveals  high  VIF  values,  which  also  proves  strong  multicollinearity,  in 
particular for the three nation-wide good governance indicators WGI, CPI and GCI.  
 
 
 
                                                 
2 If Romania were included as the 47
th country the average annual change would decrease to -0.392 from  
-0.014 in Table A.1, excluding the Faeroe Islands and Greenland.  However, including the latter two the average 
annual change over twenty years is 0.26 %, close to the average for the total harvest, 0.33 %.   
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How to proceed when there is such a strong correlation between the independent variables? 
The simplest way is to use four simple OLS models; regress i on each of the four variables 
WGI, CPI, GCI and CCC and calculate R
2. This has been done and one example of the 
resulted plots is given in Annex B Figure B.1. However, as one might have expected based 
on the analysis above, this approach does not give any clear-cut results. The second approach, 
and the one used in this paper, is a principal component analysis (PCA), computed with the 
help of SPSS. If the dependent variable i should have depended mainly on one (or two or 
three) of the four independent variables, the good governance indicators, the PCA method 
usually would have been able to detect this dependency and its strength. The results for the 
case of two principal components  are shown in Annex C. However, the only significant 
coefficient is the OECD dummy, which is negative, equal to -0.468, and with t=-2.118 this 
coefficient is now significant at the 4% level (Annex C Table C.4). Thus the OECD countries 
have generally had a negative development of fish catches in the period 1987-2007. The PCA 
(also with 3 and 4 principal components) did not reveal any hidden structure among the good 
governance indicators, but resulted in a statistical strengthening of the negative effect of the 
OECD dummy. 
 
3.2 Country ranking 
 
Based  on  the  performance  in  two  periods  there  are  several  ways  of  ranking  countries, 
including merely to refer to the figures and a classification based on a selected set of criteria. 
The former is shown in Figure 1, with the three letter code for countries
3, and the latter is 
described in Table 2. The categorisation in Table 2 of the countries’ performance over the 
two decades from 1987 to 2007 is based purely on their catch performance and does not 
explain how the fish resources in the sea have developed. 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
Table II 
Along the horizontal and vertical axes of Figure 2 are the percentage average annual growth 
of  fish  harvest  for  1987-1997  and  1997-2007  respectively.  Since  the  concentration  of 
countries  is  stronger  when  closest  to  the  origin  in  Figure  1,  this  makes  it  difficult  to 
distinguish between them. Figure 2 displays the same picture for some countries, but on a 
greater scale. In Figure 1 and Figure 2, straight border lines between the five categories have 
been drawn. To be a ‘Winner’ it is required that there is a positive growth in landings in each 
of the two decades, and of course over the whole period investigated. On the other hand, to be 
a  ‘Loser’  requires  that  the  corresponding  changes  are  negative.  For  those  in  between 
‘Winners’ and ‘Losers’, there is the question of whether there is decrease in the first decade 
and an increase in the second, or visa versa. The former are called ‘Revivers’ and the latter 
‘Rise and Decline’. Those with positive growth in the first decade and zero in the second are 
the ‘Consolidators’. Since one decade of positive growth and one of negative growth may 
imply either positive or negative averages over the whole 20 year period, the countries with 
such growth patterns, and an annual average decrease of more than half a per cent, have been  
I 
                                                 
3 ISO 3-alpha shown in Annex A, taken from at http://www.unc.edu/~rowlett/units/codes/country.htm  
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classified as ‘Losers’. This moved three countries from ‘Revivers’ and four from ‘Rise and 
Decline’ to ‘Losers’ (Table II footnote).  
 
Figure 2 
 
  
3.  Discussion  
 
This paper started out by exploring the connection between fish harvest growth and good 
governance  institutions,  partly  as  a  supplement  to  the  resource  curse  literature  where 
fisheries, and some other resources, have been left out mainly due to data problems [5]. Even 
though this paper found weak positive correlations between fish harvest growth and good 
governance indicators, this is far from being statistically significant, be it the three general 
indicators or the specific fisheries Code of Conduct Compliance indicator. Thus it cannot be 
said that fisheries performance measured by the annual growth in catches is best in nations 
with generally good institutions and little corruption. To some extent it is rather the opposite. 
For example, among the countries with high harvest growth in the two decades ending in 
1997 and 2007, i.e. to the North-east in Figures 1 and 2, are Indonesia, Myanmar, Vietnam, 
Bangladesh and Iran - and all these five are found towards the bottom of the corruption index 
CPI, as well as for the other two good governance indices, WGI and GCI (see Annex A). 
These countries also score among the lowest on the specific fisheries governance indicator 
CCC. 
 
From the findings of this paper it seems that fisheries are special compared to other natural 
resource industries in the sense that growth in harvests is not statistically correlated to good 
governance  indicators.  As  noted  above,  the  resource  curse  literature  usually  studies  the 
effects on GDP growth from, or correlation with, good governance institutions and the more 
traditional factors needed for economic production. In this paper, even though harvest growth 
is chosen as the dependent variable, it is likely that such positive growth contributes to the 
general economic growth of a country, particularly if the fishing industry is a major industry. 
However, in most countries nowadays the fishing industry is not of such importance, though 
there are exceptions. For example, in Vietnam the total export value of goods and services 
increased by a factor of about 13 from 1990 to 2007, and fish and fisheries products even 
more, increasing the industry share of total exports from about 9 % in 1990 to about 12 % in 
2007, including aquaculture products [19]. With such a strong growth in fisheries production 
for export, it is likely that this contributed to the general economic growth (GDP) of about 
7% p.a. in this period, but to what extent remains to be seen. 
 
Is fisheries performance best in nations which have adopted and comply with the UN-FAO 
Code  of  Conduct  for  Responsible  Fisheries?  Based  on  the  Nature  paper  [14]  one  could 
answer this question affirmatively, since the CC Compliance of countries is shown to be 
positively correlated to general good governance indicators. Countries which perform well on 
the expert perception and knowledge based evaluation of how fishing nations have complied 
with the CC also do well on general good governance indicators. The same has been shown 
in this paper, though the good governance indicators are partly different from those in [14]. 
However, as demonstrated above, the real performance of fisheries, here defined as harvest 
development, may be very different from the experts’ perception through the CCC index of 
how well fisheries are managed and developed. As noted above, the six top countries ranked   
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in [14] are, in declining order, Norway, USA, Canada, Australia, Iceland and Namibia, but 
according to the ranking in this paper USA, Canada and Iceland are categorized as ‘Losers’, 
Norway as a ‘Rise and Decline’ country and Australia as a ‘Consolidator’. They are all far 
from being ‘Winners’. Namibia is not included among the 53 countries in this study since it 
did not meet any of the criteria used for the selection of fishing nations. One may regret this 
in hindsight since this smaller fishing nation has an interesting management history [20]. In 
the Nature paper quoted, the pass score for the Code compliance was 70%, but not even the 
top ranking Norway at 60 % meets this target. Of the ten countries at the lower end of the 
CCC ranking, which were included in this study, as many as six were ‘Winners’, namely 
Indonesia, Myanmar, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Iran, and Egypt. Only two out of the bottom ten 
are ‘Losers’, namely Ecuador and North-Korea – the latter being at the very bottom of the 
CCC list.     
 
The Code of Conduct Compliance (CCC) is correlated with the general good governance 
indicators, both in this paper (see Annex B Table B.3) and in [14], though not as strongly as 
the WGI, CPI and GCI indices are to each other. Thus, in itself, the CCC does not add much 
to  explain  fisheries  performance  in  the  econometric  sense;  the  general  good  governance 
indicators seem good enough for such a purpose – a result that may come as a surprise to 
fisheries’ scientists and managers.  
 
In the Introduction the question is raised as to whether fisheries’ performance is best in the 
developed  nations  (such  as  the  OECD)  which  have  the  economic  means  and  knowledge 
needed for good governance. However, as demonstrated above, the actual results are far from 
good with respect to development in catches for this club of countries. On average, the 22 
OECD countries included in this study experienced an annual decline of 1.9 % in the years 
1987-2007, whereas the 27 non-OECD had an average annual increase of 2.0 % (Annex A). 
In  1958,  the  United  Nations  (UN)  addressed  the  problems  of  open  access  to  fisheries 
resources by allowing countries to establish 12 mile fishing zones, and from the mid 1970s 
there was a de facto recognition of the 200 miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The latter 
was made possible through the UN’s third Conference on the Law of the Sea (LOS), which 
lasted from 1973 to 1982 (UNCLOS III) when the LOS Convention was finally concluded. 
This development in international law made it possible for coastal states to improve their use 
of  fisheries  resources.  Previously,  many  countries  had  invested  in  ocean  going  vessels; 
targeting fish stocks close to the 12 mile zone of other states; but from the mid-1970s, this 
came to an end in most parts of the world unless bilateral agreements had been made. From 
then until 1986-7, the first years of investigation in this study, countries had the ability to 
adjust  their  fish  harvests  to  the  available  resources.  If  rich  industrialised  countries  had 
overfished due to the previous international open-access characteristics of the fisheries, this 
could  not  be  used  as  an  excuse  later.  Actually  it  took  some  time  for  countries  to  reach 
agreements on how to manage trans-boundary resources. Whether this was more prevalent in 
OECD  countries  is  not  known,  but  if  overfished  initially  they  should  have  had  positive 
growth in  the following  two decades  instead of decline. Also,  if they lost  some of their 
harvests in the late 1970s, due to their expulsion from other countries’ 200 miles EEZs, they 
had  probably  adjusted  to  this  by  1986-7.  On  the  other  hand,    in  the  coastal  states  that 
achieved more resources and control of these through their EEZs one might have expected 
that they increased catches for some years and then consolidated at a higher overall catch 
level than before. Thus more countries should have been found in the ‘Consolidators’ group 
than given in Figure 1.  
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The ‘Winners’ include many developing countries, but non from the OECD, and a pertinent 
question  is  if  they  won  just  because  they  had  not  yet  achieved  the  technological  and 
purchasing power to overexploit resources. If so, one might expect that later, one by one they 
would follow the richer countries in terms of overexploitation and that a fall in catches would 
be a result. This is a hypothesis about future development and may be tested after some years, 
but  does  not  really  contradict  the  results  presented  above.  An  alternative  hypothesis  for 
further investigation is that some countries reduced their catches to rebuild previously over-
fished stocks as a way of increasing their natural capital through genuine savings (see e.g. [9] 
[21]  and  [22]).  The  OECD  has  recently  investigated  and  compared  cases  of  rebuilding 
fisheries in an attempt to achieve an overview of some success stories [23] and to facilitate 
change  in  the  member  countries  [24]  and  [25].  Denmark  is  an  example  of  a  rich, 
industrialised  country  with  strong  general  institutions,  but  with  weak  actual  fisheries 
performance during the second decade investigated (see DNK in Figure 2). Interestingly, a 
recent economic analysis of genuine savings in Denmark revealed that the fish wealth in real 
terms was halved from 1990 to 2009 [26]. It is tempting to quote Shakespeare “Something is 
rotten in the state of Denmark” [27], but luckily for the general welfare of the Danes fish 
amounts to less than 0.5% of the country’s national genuine wealth.  
 
This paper has used catch statistics from the FAO database where data has been provided by 
the member countries. With such statistics, one may ask how reliable they are. To the best of 
the author’s knowledge there are no sources arguing for systematic flaws in the data that 
could significantly change the results of the econometric analysis of correlations between the 
harvest changes on the one hand and the governance indicators and the OECD dummy on the 
other. For the period(s) of investigation, the choice of initial and terminal years may of course 
have had an effect on the growth rates. As noted above the end year 2007 was chosen to 
include the most recent year for which FAO statistics were available at the commencement of 
this project, and a 20 year period was chosen to avoid coming to close back in time to the 
establishment of the new LOS regime that manifested itself during the late 1970s and early 
1980s in 200 miles EEZs in most fishing nations.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
In a way, the findings of this paper contrast the findings of the resource curse literature that 
good governance institutions create more economic growth. The conditional ‘in a way’ is 
used since the resource curse literature usually discusses resource abundance and the effects 
of good governance on economic growth and development, whereas this paper studies the 
correlation  between  good  governance  indicators  and  the  growth  in  fish  catches.  It  is 
demonstrated  that  fish  capture  performance  over  a  twenty  years  period  is  (statistically) 
decoupled  from  the  general  good  governance  indicators  developed  by  international 
governmental and non-governmental organisations, as well as from the UN/FAO Code of 
Conduct  for  responsible  fisheries  performance  indicators.  This  decoupling  comes  as  a 
surprise, especially with regard to the effects on institutional quality of economic growth that 
have been shown in several studies [5]. On the other hand, this decoupling may be indication 
of the sheer political and economic pressure applied in the most developed countries towards 
maintenance of their fishing industries, whereas developing countries are, in effect, at an 
earlier stage in economic development, where such pressures are in reality less decisive.   
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It is, however, surprising that OECD countries perform on average significantly worse than 
the other countries  in  the period 1987-2007 with  respect  to  catches.  The average annual 
decline of the 22 OECD countries is almost 2 %, against an annual increase of 2 % for the 
average  of  the  27  non-OECD  countries  (data  in  Annex  A).  The  econometric  correlation 
analysis, based on 46 countries, demonstrates a statistically significant negative effect on the 
annual growth in catches from the OECD dummy variable. This should warrant a closer 
scrutiny of the way rich countries manage their marine fish resources. When classifying the 
countries into five groups, including ‘Winners’ and ‘Losers’, as many as 12 of the 22 OECD 
countries are ‘Losers’, but none are among the ‘Winners’, and it will be a challenge for 
governments and stakeholders to change this. The OECD comprises mainly, but not only, 
rich developed countries; which should have the means and knowledge to improve. As noted 
above, the OECD fisheries committee has recently undertaken a study of the recovery of fish 
resources with the aim of learning from some success stories of members and to facilitate 
change. 
 
Many developing countries are ‘Winners’ with respect to harvest growth during the twenty 
years being investigated, but they may simultaneously perform badly, according to the good 
governance  indicators  of  the  World  Bank,  the  Transparency  International  and  the  World 
Economic Forum, as well if one follows the indicator developed by [14] for the UN/FAO 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Thus; despite badly functioning governments, 
corruption, unfriendly business climate and weak fisheries institutions in many developing 
countries, some of them have performed well with respect to the growth in fish catches. The 
big question is how long this may continue and what the changes will be. Fish in the wild is a 
renewable  resource  with  natural  limits  to  growth,  and  catches  may  in  the  long  run  be 
stabilised  at  about  the  maximum  sustainable  yield,  or  resources  may  be  increasingly 
overfished  with  declining  catches  as  a  result.  Several  of  the  winner  countries,  including 
Indonesia and Vietnam, still have open-access fisheries and it is clear from both empirical 
evidence and theoretical analyses that sooner or later they will hit the limits to growth. After 
that a decline with respect to catches will come, unless they introduce thorough management 
systems. These might be economic or quantitative control with inputs, outputs or technical 
restrictions, including area and seasonal closures. This may of course be challenging, but to 
realise further economic surpluses from the fisheries will be even more challenging.  
 
This article takes an important first step in investigating the performance of fishing nations 
around the world using simple but robust methods and data from a single source international 
governmental organisation, the FAO. Further investigations into why performances found in 
this article differ so much would be of interest, particularly between ‘Winners’ and ‘Losers’. 
Is it mainly because of nature, such as natural stock fluctuations, ecosystem variation and 
climate change, or because of human activities, such as weak management systems, harvest 
cost and efficiency, and fish markets? Or is it a deliberate policy of some of the countries 
classified as ‘Losers’ to reduce harvests for a period of time to produce future benefits by 
increasing their genuine savings in fish resources? One other important topic for research is 
economic performance. If comparable sets of economic data, including landing values and 
harvest  costs,  become  available,  comparative  studies  using  other  indicators  than  harvest 
volume changes, such as landing value, profit, intra-marginal rent and resource rent would be 
useful. A first step in this direction could be to compare countries at a somewhat equal level 
with respect to economic development, e.g. OECD countries, or geographical location, e.g.  
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EU member states. In fact much material, which could be used for such comparative studies, 
is already available in a range of different data bases.  
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Figure 1. Catch performance of fisheries countries in two decades, with i97 horizontally and 
i07 vertically. Countries to the Northeast and the Southwest may be called ‘Winners’ and 
‘Losers’, respectively. OECD countries in black. The three letter country codes are given in 
Annex A. 
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Table 1 Regression coefficients
a 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t  Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval for B 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B  Std. Error  Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound  Tolerance  VIF 
1 (Constant)  .440  8.047   .055  .957  -15.823  16.703    
OECD  -3.099  1.553  -.477  -1.996  .053  -6.237  .038  .382  2.621 
WGI  .192  1.580  .061  .122  .904  -3.002  3.386  .087  11.489 
CPI  .118  .660  .095  .179  .859  -1.217  1.453  .078  12.861 
GCI  .047  1.986  .010  .024  .981  -3.966  4.060  .115  8.727 
CCC  .027  .776  .011  .035  .972  -1.541  1.596  .220  4.545 
a. Dependent 
variable: i 
                
Source: own calculations 
 
 
Table 2. Categorisation of countries 
Category  i97  i07  i 
Winners  +  +  + 
Consolidators  +  0*  + 
Revivers**  -  +  +/- 
Risers and  Decliners**  +  -  +/- 
Losers  -  -  - 
*Defined as 0.00 +/- 0.50 
** If i is less than -0.50 the country has been categorised as a ‘Loser’. This additional criteria 
moves Brazil, Germany and Canada from ‘Revivers’ to ‘Losers’, and Iceland, Chile, Greece 
and United Kingdom from ‘Rise and Decline’ to ‘Losers’. 
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ANNEX A. Data file. Countries ranked according to production 2006-7 
   
Production 
(Metric 
Tons) 
Average 
annual change 
(%), 1987-2007 
Indices 
#  Name  2006-07  i  WGI  CPI  GCI  CCC  OECD 
1  China (CHN)  14645027  5.31  0.01  3.50  4.24  4.20  0 
2  Peru (PER)  7114018  1.67  -0.08  3.50  3.94  3.80  0 
3  Indonesia (IDN)  4931854  4.13  -0.26  2.30  4.26  2.70  0 
4 
United States of America 
(USA)  4809940  -0.41  1.50  7.20  5.61  5.80  1 
5  Japan (JPN)  4300835  -4.79  1.26  7.50  5.60  5.40  1 
6  Chile (CHL)  3990022  -1.31  1.41  7.00  4.85  4.60  0 
7  India (IND)  3852065  2.82  -0.03  3.50  4.44  3.60  0 
8 
Russian Federation 
(RUS)  3369262  -4.28  -0.34  2.30  4.08  2.90  0 
9  Thailand (THA)  2501880  -0.03  0.26  3.30  4.58  2.20  0 
10  Philippines (PHL)  2409356  1.95  0.03  2.50  4.00  3.30  0 
11  Norway (NOR)  2317627  1.05  1.65  8.70  5.42  6.00  1 
12  Myanmar (MMR)  2121185  5.68  -1.91  1.40  3.66*  1.10  0 
13  Viet Nam (VNM)  1995500  5.13  -0.30  2.60  3.89  2.00  0 
14 
Korea, Republic of 
(KOR)  1813674  -1.68  1.07  5.10  5.13  4.50  1 
15  Bangladesh (BGD)  1465348  4.11  -0.82  2.00  3.46  1.80  0 
16  Mexico (MEX)  1420558  0.26  0.31  3.50  4.18  4.00  1 
17  Iceland (ISL)  1363132  -0.94  1.62  9.20  5.40  5.70  1 
18  Malaysia (MYS)  1336091  2.46  0.89  5.10  5.11  4.50  0 
19  Argentina (ARG)  1078695  4.49  -0.46  2.90  4.01  3.20  0 
20 
Taiwan Province of 
China (TWN)  1070927  0.99  0.96  5.70  5.41  3.50  0 
21  Canada (CAN)  1037466  -1.97  1.64  8.70  5.37  5.80  1 
22  Spain (ESP)  890683  -1.67  1.07  6.70  4.77  4.10  1 
23  Morocco (MAR)  878042  2.39  -0.10  3.50  4.01  3.00  0 
24  Brazil (BRA)  781145  -0.93  -0.05  3.50  4.03  3.30  0 
25  Denmark (DNK)  760314  -4.18  2.05  9.40  5.70  5.00  1 
26  South Africa (ZAF)  648687  -2.75  0.58  5.10  4.36  5.50  0 
27  United Kingdom (GBR)  622036  -1.68  1.71  8.40  5.54  4.50  1 
28  Faroe Islands (FRO)  602628  2.46  ..  ..  ..  5.00  0 
29  Turkey (TUR)  582749  -0.16  0.30  4.10  4.14  1.90  1 
30  France (FRA)  544163  -0.77  1.34  7.30  5.31  4.50  1 
31  New Zealand (NZL)  485532  4.01  1.69  9.40  5.15  5.50  1 
32  Pakistan (PAK)  464805  0.59  -0.51  2.40  3.66  3.00  0 
33 
Iran (Islamic Rep of) 
(IRN)  424757  4.82  -1.15  2.50  3.94*  2.50  0 
34  Netherlands (NLD)  424469  0.12  1.72  9.00  5.56  4.70  1 
35  Ecuador (ECU)  416860  -3.16  -1.06  2.10  3.67  2.90  0 
36  Egypt (EGY)  374193  3.54  -0.35  2.90  4.07  1.70  0 
37  Italy (ITA)  301040  -1.99  0.60  5.20  4.46  4.00  1  
  18 
                                              
38  Germany (DEU)  273301  -1.08  1.58  7.80  5.58  4.40  1 
39  Sweden (SWE)  253752  0.97  1.76  9.30  5.74  4.40  1 
40  Greenland (GRL)  243357  4.36  ..  ..  ..  ..  0 
41  Portugal (PRT)  233726  -2.54  0.99  6.50  4.60  4.50  1 
42  Ukraine (UKR)  226121  -6.96  -0.52  2.70  3.89  2.10  0 
43 
Korea. Dem People's  
Rep (PRK)  205000  -7.19  -2.22  1.40*  3.46*  0.90  0 
44  Australia (AUS)  192592  0.23  1.73  8.60  5.29  5.80  1 
45  Finland (FIN)  157064  -0.08  1.71  9.40  5.76  6.00*  1 
46  Poland (POL)  148650  -7.29  0.59  4.20  4.30  3.60  1 
47  Colombia (COL)  119740  1.80  0.14  3.80  4.04  3.50*  0 
48  Greece (GRC)  97166  -1.35  0.76  4.60  4.33  4.20*  1 
49  Romania (ROU)  6423  -17.76  0.18  3.70  4.02  3.50*  0 
                 
  OECD countries  23030463  -1.89           
                 
  SUM 49 countries  80303445  0.26           
  SUM all  89805508  0.33           
  Fraction 49 of all  89.42%             
 
.. Data lacking. *Inserted by interpolation, using the country ranking according to the other 
indices, minimum two. 
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ANNEX B. Econometric results 
 
Table B.1 Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean  Std. Deviation  N 
i  -.0144  3.28390  46 
OECD  .4783  .50505  46 
WGI  .4953  1.03897  46 
CPI  5.1587  2.63038  46 
GCI  4.6087  .72065  46 
CCC  3.8522  1.33095  46 
Source: own calculations based on OECD, WGI, CPI, GCI and CCC data explained in the 
text. 
 
Table B.2 Model Summary
b 
Model  R  R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-Watson 
R Square 
Change  F Change  df1  df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1  .360
a  .130  .021  3.24933  .130  1.193  5  40  .330  1.458 
a. Predictors: (Constant), CCC, OECD, GCI, WGI, CPI             
b. Dependent Variable: i                 
 
 
Table B.3 Correlations 
    i  OECD  WGI  CPI  GCI  CCC 
Pearson Correlation  i  1.000  -.343  -.190  -.199  -.173  -.153 
OECD  -.343  1.000  .752  .775  .705  .643 
WGI  -.190  .752  1.000  .935  .917  .873 
CPI  -.199  .775  .935  1.000  .930  .855 
GCI  -.173  .705  .917  .930  1.000  .808 
CCC  -.153  .643  .873  .855  .808  1.000 
Source: own calculations. 
 
Figure B.1 Partial regression plot 
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ANNEX C. Results of the Factor Analysis and its Regression
4 
 
Table C.1 Rotated Component Matrix
a 
  Component 
  1  2 
WGI  .777  .589 
CPI  .820  .533 
GCI  .886  .426 
CCC  .478  .876 
Extraction  Method:  Principal  Component 
Analysis. 
Rotation  Method:  Varimax  with  Kaiser 
Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The complete statistical output from the analysis is upon request available from the author.  
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Table C.2 Variables Entered/Removed
b 
Model  Variables Entered 
Variables 
Removed  Method 
1  FAC2_1,  FAC1_1, 
OECD
a 
.  Enter 
a. All requested variables entered.   
b. Dependent Variable: i   
 
 
Table C.3 Model Summary
b 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted  R 
Square 
Std.  Error  of  the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R  Square 
Change 
F 
Change  df1 df2 
Sig.  F 
Change 
1  .360
a .129  .067  3.17150  .129  2.082  3  42  .117  1.454 
 a. Predictors: (Constant), FAC2_1, FAC1_1, OECD             
b. Dependent 
Variable: i 
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C.4 Coefficients
a 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t  Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval for B 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B  Std. Error  Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound  Tolerance  VIF 
1 (Constant)  1.442  .832    1.734  .090  -.236  3.121     
OECD  -3.046  1.438  -.468  -2.118  .040  -5.948  -.143  .424  2.360 
FAC1_1  .440  .667  .134  .659  .513  -.907  1.787  .502  1.993 
FAC2_1  .319  .553  .097  .577  .567  -.797  1.435  .731  1.368 
a. Dependent 
Variable: i 
               